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TIME FOR A CHANGE IN EMINENT DOMAIN: A "DIRT
FARMER'S" STORY SHOWS WHY JUST COMPENSATION
SHOULD INCLUDE LOST PROFITS

Edward Walton•

INTRODUCTION

The story of Kelo v. New Londorr has become famous,3 but perhaps more incredible than the story is the bipartisan response. 4 Fueled by "post-Kelo outrage,"~
politicians put aside their partisan differences to form unlikely alliances: "Senator John
Comyn (R-Tex.) ... found himself on the same side of the issue as Representative
Maxine Waters (D-Calif.), a liberal, and Representative Bernard Sanders (I-Vt.), a
self-described socialist.'o6 In effect, the U.S. Supreme Court's 2005 Kelo decision inadvertently provided legislators with a bipartisan opportunity: eminent domain reform.7
In Kelo, the Court considered whether condemning homes, as part of the city of
New London's development plan, "qualifl:ied] as a 'public use' within the meaning
ofthe Takings Clause ofthe Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. "8 The goal of the
"development plan" was ''to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, to increase tax and other
revenues, and to revitalize an economically distressed city.'o9 To accomplish those
ends, the plan aimed to redevelop "90 acres of Fort Trumbull in order to complement the facility that Pfizer was planning to build ... .''10 The catch, however, was
"' JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2019. BA, Wake Forest University, 2011.
I would like to thank my friends, family, and teachers for their support in all my endeavors.
Also a special thanks to the editorial staff and executive board of the William & Mary Bill of
Rights Journal for all oftheir guidance and hard work in preparing this Note for publication.
2
545 u.s. 469 (2005).
3
See id.; LITILE PINK HOUSE (Korchula Productions 20 17).
4
CARIAT.MAIN,BULI.DOZED:''KELo,"EMINENTDoMAJN,AND1HEAMERICANLUSTFOR
LAND 174--79 (2007). See also Ron Arnold, A Big Victory for Restoring Private Property
Rights, WASH.ExAMINER(Mar.l,2012, 12:00AM),http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/a
-big-victoty-for-restoring-private-property-rights/arti.cle/327151 [https://perma.cc/GU84-RJ5R].
5
MAIN, supra note 4, at 178.
6
Id. at 178-79.
7
Id. (''In the seven days following Kelo, the U.S. House ofRepresentatives spit out bill
after bill with heroic titles like the Protection ofHomes, Small Businesses and Private Property
Act; the Eminent Domain Limitation Act; and the Private Property Rights Protection Act.
Aside from situations of national emergency or war, Congress rarely moves so fast'').
8
545 U.S. at 472, 475; U.S. CONST. amend. V (''nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.").
~ Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472.
10
Id. at 495 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
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that certain homeowners had to leave their homes to implement the plan. 11 Facing
condemnation, the homeowners "contend[ed] that using eminent domain for economic development impermissibly blurs the boundary between public and private
takings,''12 a notion the Court rejected. 13 In her dissent, Justice O'Connor harshly
critiqued the majority opinion and its broad understanding of"public use":
To reason, as the Court does, that the incidental public benefits resulting from the subsequent ordinary use ofprivate property render
economic development takings 'for public use' is to wash out any
distinction between private and public use of property-and
thereby effectively to delete the words 'for public use' from the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 14
For Justice 0' Connor, the Court's holding and interpretation of"public use" had
serious implications: "The specter ofcondemnation hangs over all property. Nothing
is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home
with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory." 1' It seems Americans shared
Justice O'Connor's concerns: "An MSNBC website poll revealed that ninety-eight
percent of Americans disagreed with the Supreme Court's decision." 16
Unfortunately, in New London, not only did the property owners lose their
homes, but in 2009 Pfizer "announced it would leave the city."17 With its departure,
Pfizer "pull[ed] 1,400 jobs .... " 18 Effectively, "[t]hey stole our home for economic
development," Mr. Cristofaro explained to the New York Times. 19 "It was all for Pfizer,
and now they get up and walk away."20
Kelo sparked national concerns over eminent domain abuse, presenting unique political opportunities for bipartisan allegiances and widespread reform. 21 For example, on
the federal level, the bipartisan duo of Congresswoman Maxine Waters (D-CA) and
Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.) found a convergence ofinterests in "curbing
11

I d. at 4 75 (majority opinion).
Id. at 485.
13
See id. at 490.
14
Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
15
Id. at 503.
16
MAIN, supra note 4, at 174.
17
Patrick McGeehan, Pfizer to Leave City That Won Land-Use Case, N.Y. TIMBs(Nov.l2,
2009), https://nyti.ms/2kY5vlw.
11 Id.
19
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
20
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
21
Ilya Somin, The Political and Judicial Reaction to Kelo, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 4, 20 15), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracylwp/2015
/06/04/the-political-and-judicial-reaction-to-kelo/?utm_term=.3d473bbfa06d [https ://perma
.cc/KW48-WW8F].
12
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eminent domain abuses.,,nAsa result, they sponsored the Private Property Rights Protection Act, a bill designed to protect against "eminent domain power to transfer private
property to other private parties for the purpose of economic development."23 The pair
have supported the legislation for years, even passing it in "the House in 2005, 2012,
and 2014."24
Sensenbrenner and Waters have complementary goals in supporting the legislation. Congressman Sensenbrenner aims to ''restore the government's power of
eminent domain to its limited, proper role."25 Congresswoman Waters, on the other
hand, hopes to prevent eminent domain abuses that have impacted "[b]etween 3 and
4 million Americans, most of them ethnic minorities."26 She explained that since the
1940s, these individuals "have been forcibly displaced from their homes as a result
of urban renewal takings."27 These takings often come "at the expense ofthe poor
and politically weak."28
In addition to politicians working across the aisle, a broad range of advocacy
groups and states have addressed eminent domain abuses.29 For example, an impressive coalition of groups has come together, including the NAACP, ''the Farm Bureau,
the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and theNational Federation oflndependent Business."30 But arguably the most effective response to Kelo
has come from the states: "forty-four states have reformed their eminent domain
laws."31 Moreover, "[a] dozen states have gone even further and amended their state
constitutions to stop eminent domain for private gain.'m
22

Press Release, Maxine Waters, Representative, House ofR.epresentatives, Representatives
Waters, Sensenbrenner Reintroduce the Private Property Rights Protection Act (Mar. 22, 2017),
https://waters.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/congressman-waters-reintroduces-pri
vate-property-rights-protection-act [https ://perma.cc/5XVW-KJLS] [hereinafter Press Release,
Maxine Waters].
23 Id.
24
Ilya Somin, House Passes Private Property Rights Protection Act-But Celebration
is Premature, REASON: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 26, 2018), https://reason.com/vol
okh/2018/07/26/houses-passes-property-rights-protection [https://penna.cc/Z4LN-6TD7].
25
Press Release, Maxine Waters, supra note 22.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28
House Tries to Rewrite Eminent Domain Rules, CBS NEWS (Feb. 28, 2012, 9:40PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/house-tries-to-rewrite-eminent-domain-rules [https://perma
.cc/BP6L-4VB9].
29
Nick Sibilla, It's Time For Congress To Actively Condemn Eminent Domain Abuses,
FORBES (June 28, 2013, 8:00AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/20 13/06/28/its-time
-for-congress-to-actively-condemn-eminent-domain-abuses/#6ec8389964c2 [https://perma.cc
/D87Q-ETIW].
30 Id.
31
Eminent Domain, INsT. JusT., http://ij.org/issueslprivate-property/eminent-domain [https://
penna.cc/ML2T-DKGW].
32 Id.
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With the country wary of eminent domain and open to curbing abuses following
Kelo, now is a perfect time to implement other common-sense reforms to protect
against eminent domain abuses, including fixing interpretations ofjust compensation
in the Takings Clause. Specifically,just compensation under the Takings Clause in the
Fifth Amendment should include consequential damages/3 such as "loss of profits,"34
"business good will,'>J5 and "going-concern value."36 The importance of these reforms
can be seen through the stmy of Chad Jarreau, a Louisiana dirt farmer whose property
was taken.37
In Jarreau's case, the taking of his land impacted his dirt excavation business,
leading the trial court to award him "$164,705.40 for economic and business losses." 38
However, the Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed, denying lost profits to Jarreau for
his business losses and limiting his compensation to ''that required by the Fifth Amendment, which is the fair market value ofthe property at the time ofthe appropriation"an award of$11,869. 39
To properly accommodate property owners like Jarreau for their losses, the
Supreme Court should adopt the 1974 standard Louisiana had in place for takings
compensation: "compensated to the full extent of [the] loss.'..w As the Louisiana Supreme Court explained, the standard required that the property owner "be placed in an
equivalent financial position to that which he enjoyed before the taking.'>41 Anything
33

See State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 823 n.2 (Alaska 1976). It should be noted that courts
do not uniformly refer to these damages as consequential damages. For example, the Alaska
Court stated: "[W]e prefer to call them incidental damages, reserving 'consequential' damages
to describe losses to the remainder ofa condemner's property in instances ofpartial taking." Id.
34
Comment, ConsequentialDamages and "Just Compensation" in Federal Condemnations,
18 u. em. L. REv. 349,349-50 (1951).
3
~ Id. at 350 n.5 ("Good will has been defined as the value of the business reputation of
the finn and the patronage that accompanies it or as the value ofanticipated future profits based
on the past earnings of the business.'').
36
Id. at 350 n.6 (noting that the going-concern value "consists of the intangible contributions to the value ofthe business such as patronage and increased earning power because
of skillful management'').
37
S. Lafourche Levee Dist v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d298 (La. 2017); Mark Sherman, Louisiana
'DirtFarmer'AsksSupremeCourt'sHelp,U.S.NEws(Oct.26,2017,5:43AM),https:/lwww.us
news.com/news/politics/articles/20 17-1 0-26/louisiana-dirt-farmer-asks-supreme-courts-help
[https://perma.cc/D3RF-2A2V).
38
Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 302.
39
Id. at 311-12.
40
Id. at 306.
41
Id. (discussing the more robust protections in place under the 1974 Louisiana Constitution). The 2006 Louisiana constitutional amendments removed these protections for takings
related to hurricane protection projects. See La. CONST. art. 1, § 4(G) (adding § 4(G) to limit
compensationforhurricaneprojects); id. art. 6, § 42;LA. STAT.ANN. § 38:301 (C)(1)(h);LA.
STAT. ANN.§ 38:281(3)(defining "fair market value" for takings under article 1, section4(G)
and article 6, section 42); LA. STAT. ANN.§ 38:281(4) (redefining "full extent of the loss" for

2019]

TIME FOR A CHANGE IN EMINENT DOMAIN

1287

less than the "equivalent financial position" before the loss is not just compensation
because the person is not being ''made whole, for actions taken against them. 42
The Supreme Court in Kimball Laundry co. v. United States43 supported the
notion that compensation for temporary takings could include consequential damages,
such as injury to the going-concern value. 44 The Court, however, limited compensation for consequential damages to temporary takings, not extending it to permanent
takings, i.e., "[w]hen fee title to business property has been taken.'"'5 The Court
should expand its understanding to permanent takings, because permanent takings
tend to be more burdensome than temporary takings.46 Moreover, fair market value
compensation often fails to satisfy just compensation requirements of putting the
owner "in the same position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property
had not been taken" as it fails to account for inciden1al costs or consequential damages
resulting from the taking.47
The practical impact of requiring higher levels of compensation for takings is
that the government might more judiciously utilize its eminent domain powers. 48 In
effect, the higher costs for takings would incentivize the government to: {1) act
cautiously in exercising its eminent domain power and be more selective in the location choices for takings;49 and (2) provide advance notice to condemnees so they
can alleviate disruptions to their businesses.50
Section LA ofthis Note offers a brief background on the origins ofthe Fifth
Amendment and just compensation, exploring John Locke and James Madison's
understandings of the proper role of government related to property and protection

takings to a constricted understanding that "shall not exceed the market value" under article
1, section 4(G) and article 6, section 42).
42
Home v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 (2015) (finding the property owner
''must be made whole" as the owner ''is entitled to be put in as good a position pecuniarily
as if his property had not been taken... .'').
43
338 u.s. 1 (1949).
44
Id. at 15.
45
Id. at 14.
46
I d. at23 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (''There would be a complete destruction ofthe traderoutes ifthe taking of the plant were permanent and a depreciation ofthem (I assume) where
it is temporary. Why the latter is compensable when the former is not is a mystery.").
47
United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970); Luber v. Milwaukee Cty., 177
N.W.2d 380, 384 (Wis. 1970) (''In theory, the market value standard is directed toward
compensating the condemnee for the physical property loss suffered; thus it generally excludes recompense for incidental losses--losses typified by damage to or destruction ofgood
will...."(citations omitted)).
4
' See State v. Hammer, 550 P .2d 820, 827 (Alaska 1976) ("The amount ofsuch damages
is a matter largely within the state's control.'').
49
Amicus Curiae Brief of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioners at 15, S.
LafourcheLeveeDist. v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d298 (La. 2017) (No. 17-163), 2017 WL 3867884
[hereinafter Brief Amici Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation].
~ 0 Hammer, 550 P.2d at 827.
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ofrights. In Sections I.B and I.C, this Note examines the U.S. Supreme Court's, the
Alaska Supreme Court's, and the Louisiana Supreme Court's interpretations ofjust
compensation related to lost profits resulting from takings.
Section II.A examines South Lafourche Levee District v. Jarreazr 1 in order to
highlight the importance of expanding just compensation to include lost profits. In
particular, the taking ofJarreau's land significantly impacted Jarreau beyond the fair
market value of his land, failing to provide him with the value of his dirt, ~2 disrupting fulfillment of his existing contracts,53 and imperiling his business's longevity
and location. 54
In Section ll.B, this Note rebuts three theories against awarding compensation
for lost profits highlighted in State v. Hammer 5: (1) ''that damage to personal property
need not be compensated for''; (2) ''that the state has taken the land only, and not the
business"; and (3) ''that the damages are too speculative to be awarded."~ 6
Section ll. C considers a new standard for just compensation. Section ll. C.l
explores why the Supreme Court should expand Kimball Laundry to include consequential damages for temporary takings and permanent takings. Section ll.C.2
looks at adopting the 1974 Louisiana standard "compensated to the full extent of
[the] loss."" Finally, in Section II.D, this Note presents two crucial practical benefits
of a broadened understanding ofjust compensation.
I. HISTORY OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AND JUST COMPENSATION

A. Philosophical and Historical Development: Fifth Amendment and Just
Compensation for Taking ofProperty
To understand the development ofthe Just Compensation Clause and its inclusion
in the Constitution, it is helpful to step back and consider the enlightenment thinkers
that influenced the Founding Fathers. John Locke, in particular, had a major influence
on the principles underlying the founding ofAmerica and is instructive in understanding their conception of the proper role of government.58 For Locke, people leave the
51

217 So.3d 298 (La. 2017).
Id See BriefAmici Curiae ofNational Federation oflndependentBusiness Small Business
Legal Center et al. in Support ofPetitioner at 20, S. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 217 S.
3d 298 (La 2017) (No. 17-163), 2017 WL 4231477 [hereinafter BriefAmici Curiae NFIB]
("Jarreau has been denied compensation for his carefully cultivated commercial-grade dirt.'').
53
See id. at 11-12.
54
See id. at 13-14.
55
550 P.2d 820 (Alaska 1976)
56
Id. at 823.
57
SeeS. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298, 306 (La. 2017).
58
The Declaration oflndependence is one prominent example of Locke's influence on
52

the Founding as the language of the Declaration mimics the ideas, and even some of the language, of Locke. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT AND A LETIER
CONCERNING TOLERATION 5 (J.W. Gough ed., Oxford: Basil Blackwell1948) (''The state of
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state of nature and enter into civil society to receive certain protections of their
individual rights not available in the state of nature. s9 The individual's rights are not
safe in the state of nature-a state prior to the creation of society and governmentbecause "some individuals continually try to take that which by right belongs to
others. "60 As a result, the individual faces"[u ]ncertainty and insecurity," limiting the
ability to plan, "which prevents individuals from effectively utilizing their talents
and external goods. "61 They, therefore, leave the state of nature to attain certain protections through society. 62 However, unless ''the sovereign is to be fully constrained,
so that the lives, liberties, and estates of the citizens may be preserved," individuals
will suffer the same abuses and uncertainty under an unconstrained government as
they did in the state of nature. 63 The proper role of government is to determine "how
the natural rights over labor and property can be preserved in form and enhanced in
value by the exercise of political power. "64
Similarly, James Madison, the author of the Bill ofRights, thought just government ''protect[s] property of every sort.,ms In his 1792 essay Property, published after
the Bill ofRights, Madison explained how a ''just government ... impartially secures"
property rights of all citizens.66 An unjust government, in contrast, takes property
"by arbitrary seizures of one class of citizens for the service of the rest. 'o67 Property
rights are more susceptible to these abuses "[w ]here an excess of power prevails.•o68
Madison explains how a just government cannot take property "directly even for
public use without indemnification to the owner.'o69 Madison also warns that American
nature has a law ofnature to govern it, which obliges every one; and reason, which is that law,
teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that, being all equal and independent, no one ought
to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions."); see also THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para 2 (U.S. 1776) ('We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit ofHappiness.").
9
j
See LOCKE, supra note 58, at 62 ("[I]n the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the
enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasions of others.... This
makes him willing to quit this condition, which, however free, is full of fear and continual
dangers. . .. he seeks out and is willing to join in society with others. . .. for the mutual
preservation oftheir lives, liberties, and estates.").
60
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRivATE PROPERTY AND niE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 3 (1985).
61 Id.
62
See LOCKE, supra note 58, at 62.
63
EPSTEIN, supra note 60, at 163.
64
Id. at3.
6
~ James Madison, Property, http://press-pubs. uchicago.edulfounders/documents/v1ch16s
23.html [https://permacc/HK.7Y-DZW2]. See also William Michael Treanor, The Origins
and Original Significance ofthe Just Compensation Clause ofthe Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE
L.J. 694, 694 (1985).
66
Madison, supra note 65.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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government should not follow "a pattern" that "indirectly violates their property,
in their actual possessions, in the labor that acquires their daily subsistence, and in the
hallowed remnant of time which ought to relieve their fatigues and soothe their
cares ... .''70 While Madison did not explicitly mention business losses, Madison's
vision for property rights in America include protections for "indirect[] violat[ions]"
of property rights.71 These indirect violations, such as interferences with the "labor
that acquires their daily subsistence," resemble the business losses that indirectly
result from a taking.72
Examining the language of the Constitution, the Fifth Amendment states: "nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. " 73 According to the Supreme Court, just compensation includes the "full monetary equivalent
of the property taken.'m More specifically, "[t]he owner is to be put in the same position monetarily as he would have occupied ifhis property had not been taken."'~ In
other words, the property owner "must be made whole" as the owner "is entitled to
be put in as good a position pecuniarily as ifhis property had not been taken ...." 76
Despite these precedents, the Court has reached differing conclusions on whether
to extend compensation to consequential damages, such as going-concern value,
depending on whether the taking is permanent or temporary.77

B. History ofCompensationfor Business Losses: Mitchell and Kimball Laundry

In 1925, the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. United States78 denied "consequential
damages for losses to [a] business, or for its des1ruction."79 The case arose from a
taking in 1917 of 440 acres, where the plaintiff"rais[ed] [and canned] whole-grain
Shoe Peg com.''80 In exchange for taking their "farm and canning plant" the government provided $76,000 as compensation. 81 But after, the ''plaintiffs were ... unable
70

Id.

71

See id.
See id.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970).

72
73
74
75

Id.
Homev. Dep't. ofAgric., 135 S. Ct. 2419,2434 (2015) (quoting Olson v. United States,
54 S. Ct. 704, 708 (1934)). See also U.S. v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943)("Such compensation means the full and perfect equivalent in money of the property taken. The owner is to
be put in as good [a] position pecuniarily as he would have occupied ifhis property had not
been taken.'').
77
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 11, 14-15 (1949) (providing compensation for "demonstrable loss ofgoing-concern value" wuler temporary takings). In contrast,
compensation does not extend to permanent takings because ''the going-concern value has
not been taken." Id. at 11.
71
267 u.s. 341 (1925).
79
Id. at 345.
80
Mitchell v. United States, 58 Ct. Cl. 443, 443 (1923).
11
Id. at 445.
76
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to reestablish themselves in their former business of growing and canning this kind
of com" because the government had taken "a very large part of the lands in that
section of country available for and especially adapted to the growing of Shoe Peg
com ...." 82 The business losses did not matter to the Court: "[i]fthe business was
destroyed, the destruction was an unintended incident ofthe taking ofland."83
In 1949, the Court in Kimball Laundry adjusted its standard, interpreting just
compensation to include consequential damages resulting from a temporary taking,
such as going-concern value. 84 However, the Court only applied this rule to temporary takings, not permanent takings. 85
In Kimball Laundry, the government took possession of a laundry property
during WWII from November 22, 1942 until March 23, 1946.86 In addition to awarding
the owner compensation for the rental value ofthe property, the Court also awarded
compensation for intangible losses to the property, including "demonstrable loss of
going-concern value.'.s7 The temporary taking effectively "appropriated the Laundry's opportunity to profit from its trade routes," which "depriv[ed] the owner ofthe
going-concern value of his business," including goodwill they developed with
customers. 88 Excellent service creates goodwill with customers and that goodwill has
value because the customers ''will continue to want particular goods or services"
from "a particular supplier ofthem.'789 In these circumstances, ''the intangible acquires
a value to a potential purchaser no different from the value of the business' physical
property. •'19o The Court explained that "[i]n determining the value of a business ...
the goodwill and earning power due to effective organization are often more important elements than tangible property.'r.~ 1
The Court, in its assessment, made a distinction between a temporary taking and
a permanent taking.92 Since it was a temporary taking, the laundry owner's "investment
remained bound up in the reversion ofthe property," and he could not relocate the business to a new location because he still owned the premises taken by the government 93
It would not make sense for the laundry to open a second location, especially given the
uncertainty of when the condemned property would be free from government use. 94
81

Id.
Mitchell, 267 U.S. at 345.
84
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 15 (1949).
8
~ See id. at 11, 14-15.
86
Id. at 3-4.
87
Id. at 15-16.
81
Id. at 13-14.
89
Id. at 10.
90
Id. at 11.
91
Id. {internal quotations omitted).
92
See id. at 14-15.
93
Id. at 14.
94
See id.
83
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In contrast, the Court reasoned that a permanent taking allows the impacted
owner to transfer locations and maintain the going-concern value of the business as
"only the physical property has been condemned, leaving the owner free to move his
business to a new location.'>9~ Therefore, permanent takings create no obligation to
compensate for consequential damages to a business. 96

C. Alaska and Louisiana: Other Jurisdictions Interpreting Just Compensation
and Business Losses
1. Alaska: State v. Hammer-"Loss of Profits Due to Business Interruption•>97
The Alaska Supreme Court awarded lost profits compensation in State v.
Hammer. 98 In order to build a highway, the State of Alaska forced Richard Kito to
vacate his leasehold and relocate his bar business on September 29, 1973.99 On the
day Alaska vacated him, Kito had not yet found a new location for his bar. 100 He
explored many "alternative locations, including dry-docking a small ferry boat,"
before he "fmally constructed a building for the bar, with the help of a substantial
Small Business Administration loan.''101 His business ''reopened in July 1974, nine
months after it had closed.'' 102 The jury in the trial court found that "five of the nine
months" Kito had his business interrupted ''were directly caused by the state's taking
ofKito's leasehold."103
The Alaska Supreme Court assessed ''whether temporary loss of profits due to
business interruption directly resulting from a state's taking ofthe land on which the
business operated is a damage to property compensable under our constitution.''104
Typically, incidental damages, 105 such as lost profits, are precluded from compensation as "a loss which does not give rise to an action for damages." 106 The Alaska
Supreme Court highlighted three theories courts use to reject awarding compensation for lost profits: (I) ''that damage to personal property need [not] be compensated for;" (2) ''that the state has taken the land only, and not the business;" and (3)
9

~

I d. at 11 (citations omitted).
Id.
97
State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 823 (Alaska 1976).
91
I d. at 825-27.
99
Id. at 822.
1oo Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103
Id. at 823.
104 Id.
96

10

~ /d. at 823 n.2 (Alaska 1976). The Alaska Court prefers the phrase ''incidental damages"
over "consequential damages." Id.
106
Id. at 823.
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''that the damages are too speculative to be awarded. " 107 The Alaska Supreme Court
rejected all three theories in Hammer. 108
Concerning the first theory-"that damage to personal property need [not] be
compensated for'.t 09---under "statute and case law," Alaska includes ''personal property" among ''the categories of property for which the condemnor must compensate
the owner."110
The Alaska Supreme Court also rejected the second theory, which denies compensation because "the state has taken the land only," an approach found in the U.S.
Supreme Court's ruling in Mitchell v. United States. 111 Under Mitchell, the government does not take or intend to take the business: "Ifthe business was destroyed, the
destruction was an unintended incident of the taking of the land." 112 The Alaska
Supreme Court found Mitchell's approach to have "several serious flaws."113 The
first flaw was "looking at the benefit to the condemnor as a measure of compensation,"
not the "loss to the owner."114 The Mitchell approach, the Alaska Supreme Court
explained, "conflicts with [Alaska's] principle of compensation, which, instead of
looking at the benefit to the condemnor as a measure of compensation, looks to the
loss to the owner." 115 Similarly, the Court in Kimball Laundry acknowledged that
point, relying on Justice Holmes's question: ''what has the owner lost, not what has
the taker gained?"116 The second flaw with the Mitchell approach was its inapplicability in Alaska. 117 According to the Alaska Supreme Court, the Alaska Constitution
has more stringent protections for just compensation than the U.S. Constitution,
which "does not expressly require compensation for damage to property."118
The third, and most important, flaw in the Mitchell approach is "it fails to provide
a realistic measure ofwhat has been taken."119 Specifically, the Alaska court criticized
Mitchell because "[t]he court simply ignored, for the purposes of compensation, the
destruction of Mitchell's business." 120 By ignoring the harm caused to businesses,
"[t]his court would poorly serve the law if it were to so blind itself to the realities

Id.
Id. at 823-27.
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Id. at 824 (quoting Mitchell v. U.S., 267 U.S. 341, 345 (1925)).
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of condemnation." 121 By highlighting three flaws in the Mitchell approach, the
Alaska Supreme Court strongly criticized the second theory for denying compensation for loss of profits. 122
The Alaska Supreme Court also rejected the third theory for denying damages
for loss ofprofits: the claim that loss of profits is too speculative. 123 For the Hammer
court, the "too speculative" theory was essentially an excuse not to compensate lost
profits because lost profits are calculable and awarded in other legal contexts. 124 The
Hammer court explained: "Loss of profits damages have been awarded in a variety
of civil contexts, including tort actions (both personal and business), breach of contract actions, antitrust suits, and suits for infringement of a patent or trademark."m
To prove lost profits, Hammer held "damages must be 'reasonably certain"' to
''the trier of fact" based on "evidence on the record and reasonable inferences therefrom, not from mere speculation and wishful thinking."126 The reasonable certainty
standard only allows for provable damages, while preventing compensation for
''truly speculative" claims, such as those that "depend on unrealized contingencies,
unproved products, or the like."127
After rejecting the three theories against compensating lost profits, the Alaska
Supreme Court grounded its rationale in fairness reasoning because "[w]ithout such
a rule, the State forces a property owner to pay a greater portion of the costs of a
public project than any other taxpayer must pay by affiicting him with the unavoidable expenses ofcondemnation."128 This reasoning tracks the U.S. Supreme Court's
rationale for just compensation: "The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private
property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. " 129
Practical considerations also played a role in the Alaska Supreme Court's decision as the amount the government owes in incidental costs is "largely within the
state's control."130 It can avoid paying these damages "by giving precise and early
notice ofthe date when the property must be vacated," thus keeping ''the loss ofprofits
due to necessary business interruption to a minimum.''131 By accommodating the
121
122
123
124
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Id.
Id.
Id.
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I d. See also EPSTEIN, supra note 60, at 54. Richard Epstein makes a similar argument:
"no private defendant could escape payment if he forcibly ejected an owner from his place
ofbusiness." Id.
126
Hammer, 550 P.2d at 824-25.
127
Id. at 825.
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Id. at827 (quoting Stewart&Grindle,Inc. v. S1ate, 524P.2d 1242, 1250 (Alaska 1974)).
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Annstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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Hammer, 550 P.2d at 827.
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property owner and allowing them ample time to prepare for an impending taking,
"[t]he amount of such damages is a matter largely within the state's control." 132 Such
a solution would benefit both the property owner and the government. 133
2. Modern Example: Louisiana-South Lafourche Levee District v. Ja"eau
On January 10, 2011, the South Lafourche Levee District ("Levee District'') sent
Jarreau a letter, telling him to "immediately cease and desist performing any and all
activities" on a portion of his property. 134 The Levee District wielded the authority
as a result of Resolution 11-01,m which appropriated Jarreau's property through
''permanent levee servitude" for use in "hurricane protection projects. " 136 The appropriation applied to 0.913 acres of Jarreau's "17.1 acre tract ofland," where he has his
home and operates his business. 137 On his land, Jarreau runs Bayou Construction &
Trucking Co., "a dirt excavation and hauling business."138
Jarreau, however, continued his excavation of the appropriated land because he
had ''to satisfy contractual obligations for Bayou Construction." 139 Specifically,
Jarreau had to fulfill "a contract for 23,000 cubic yards ... of dirt--enough to cover
a football field nearly a foot deep!'140 It would be difficult for Jarreau to fulfill the
contract unless he continued digging the appropriated land, because he had already
"dug up pretty much the whole property." 141 The appropriation took the back portion
of his lot, but when he first began excavating he had "started in the front." 142 Had
he known the back tract of his land would be subject to an appropriation, Jarreau
''would have started in the back."143
In response to Jarreau's continued excavation ofthe dirt, "[o]n May 19,2011,
the Levee District filed a petition to enjoin Jarreau from excavating and removing
any more dirt from the appropriated servitude and sought monetary damages for the
'wrongful' excavation."144 The Levee District followed this petition with a check to
Jarreau "in the amount of $1,326.69 as compensation for the full market value of
appropriated property. " 14~
132
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Id. at 301--02.
136
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Jarreau disagreed with the Levee District's assessment of his property's worth
and filed a counterclaim, seeking, among other things, "compensation for the appropriated land, severance damages to the land, buildings, and improvements; [and]
economic and business losses."146 His business, Bayou Construction, also joined the
suit, "seeking compensation for lost profits, legal interest, and costs arising from the
appropriation." 147
The trial court ultimately agreed with Jarreau and Bayou Construction that
compensation for the appropriation should extend to lost profits. 148 In assessing lost
profits, the court examined the estimates ofJarreau's CPA and engineer, who carried
out "extensive calculations of lost profits considering that because of the taking the
defendants were no longer able to dig and sell dirt from this particular tract."149 In
addition, "[t]he Court also made note of the fact that Mr. Jarreau stated, without
contradiction, that the quality of the dirt in the rear tract that was taken was the best
soil on his whole 17 acres.'o~~o In their writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, the
petitioners summed up the factors the trial court considered: "(1) the particular
quality of the dirt taken and the existence of a contract to sell some of that dirt, (2)
the total quantity of dirt available for excavation on the property, (3) the cost of
excavating and selling it, and (4) the price at which it could be sold."m
As a result ofthese arguments, the trial court awarded "$164, 705.40 for economic
and business losses." 1 ~2 In addition, the trial court awarded ''the Levee District damages
of$16,956.00 for the dirt [Jarreau] excavated from the appropriated property," but
also "awarded Jarreau $11 ,869.00 as just compensation for the appropriated tract. " 1 ~3
The Louisiana Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court's assessment "revers[ing] the award of $164,705.40 against the Levee District." 1 ~ The Louisiana
Appeals Court claimed: "The current law under our amended constitution does not
support any award for just compensation beyond the fair market value of the property
on the date of the appropriation." 15 ~ Therefore, the compensation does not include
"lost profit damages associated with the value of the dirt in the Jarreau tract.''1' 6
146

147
14s

Id.
Id.
Id.

149

17th Judicial District Cowt for the Parish ofLafourche, Rendition ofJudgment and Hearing on Motion, Relevant Excerpts, Oct. 17, 2014, App. 97, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp
-content/uploads/2017/08/17-163-petition.pdf[https://penna.cc/2BWB-GA5A].
t5o
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m Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, S. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298
(2017) (No. 17-163).
152
Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 302.
153
Id. at 302-03.
154
S. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 192 So. 3d 214, 228 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2016).
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The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the Appeals Court's reversal of the lost
profits awarded for the value of the dirt. 157 The Court held that the 2006 Amendments
to the Louisiana Constitution and statutes only required just compensation as "required
by the Fifth Amendment" to the United States Constitution, which is based on the "fair
market value ofthe property at the time ofthe appropriation."158 Prior to 2006, a more
robust standard of compensation was in place for all takings. 159 Specifically, in 1974,
Louisiana enacted a constitutional requirement for compensation ''to the full extent
ofhis loss."160
Under the "full extent of his loss" standard, Louisiana "broadened the measure
of damages"161 beyond both the "fair market value" and "severance damages to the
remainder. '.t 62 The broader standard required, in addition, that the impacted property
owner "be placed in an equivalent financial position to that which he enjoyed before
the taking. " 163 The standard would include the compensation Jarreau sought, such
as "inconvenience and loss of profits from the takings of business premises so that
landowners were compensated for their loss, not merely the loss of their land. " 164
The 2006 amendment to the Louisiana Constitution, however, constricted compensation for takings related to hurricane protection projects redefining '"full extent
ofthe loss' to the more restrictive 'just compensation' measure required by the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution."165 Because of these limitations on
compensation, the Louisiana Supreme Court restricted Jarreau's compensation to
that ''required by the Fifth Amendment, which is the fair market value of the property at the time ofthe appropriation." 166 Therefore, the compensation did "not include
loss [of] profits and other severance damages."167

157

Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 313.
Id. at 302-03 n.5.
m Id. at 306.
160
Id. See also Tracy Lee Howard, Compensating an Owner to the Full Extent ofHis
Loss: A Reevaluation ofCompensable Damages in Louisiana Expropriation Cases, 51 LA.
L. REv. 821, 821-26 (1991) (providing background on the 1974 constitutional amendment
requiring compensation ''to the full extent of his loss").
161
Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 306.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165
See LA. CONST. art. 1, § 4(G) (adding § 4(G) to limit compensation for hurricane
projects); id. art. 6, § 42; LA. STAT.ANN. § 38:301 (C)(l)(h); LA. STAT.ANN. § 38:281(3)(defming ''fair market value" for takings under article 1, section 4(G) and article 6, section 42);
LA. STAT. ANN.§ 38:281(4) (redefining "full extent of the loss" for takings to a constricted
understanding that "shall not exceed the market value" under article 1, section 4(G) and article 6, section 42).
166
Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 311.
161 Id.
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Jarreau filed a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, which it denied. 168 Both
the petition and its denial generated news coverage, showing the public interest in
addressing applications ofjust compensation. 169 Even though the Court denied the
petition, Jarreau's story is helpful in understanding why the Court should adopt a
consistent application for consequential damages, rather than maintaining its inconsistent application of different standards for permanent and temporary takings. 170

ll.ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court should adjust its standard for just compensation to extend to
consequential damages, such as business losses. Louisiana's previous standard''placed in an equivalent fmancial position to that which he enjoyed before the
taking"-better captures the spirit of just compensation. 171 Anything less than the
equivalent position before the loss is not just compensation because the person is not
being made whole for government actions taken against them. 172 Moreover, the
Court should extend the protections for temporary takings in Kimball Laundry to
include permanent takings because permanent takings cause a more significant
burden than temporary takings. 173
Eminent domain must adapt to the changing uses of property as ''the original
rationale for denying business losses in eminent domain-[that] most land taken was
undeveloped land-has now been superseded by more modern principles." 174 Alaska
provides an exemplary account of how states should proceed, m but property owners
168

Jarreau v. S. Lafourche Levee Dist., 217 So.3d 298, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 381
(2017). See also Jarreau v. S. Lafourche Levee Dist., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog
.com/case-:files/cases/jarreau-v-south-lafourche-levee-district [https://perma.cc/FVC6-FHBZ]
(showing proceedings and orders related to Jarreau, including denial of the petition on
October 30, 2017).
169
See, e.g., Aurora Barnes, Petition ofthe Day: Jarreau v. South Lafourche Levee District,
SCOTUSBLOG (Sep. 7, 2017, 6:18PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/20 17/09/petition-of-the
-day-1220 [https://perma.cc/3LPM-T5HV]; Sherman, supra note 37.
170
Kimball Laundry Co. v. U.S., 338 U.S. 1, 11, 14-15 (1949)(providingcompensationfor
"demonstrable loss ofgoing-concern value" under temporary takings). In contrast, compensation does not extend to permanent takings because ''the going-concern value has not been
taken." Id. at 11.
171
Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 306.
172
Home v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 (2015).
173
Kimball, 338 U.S. at 23 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
174
Brief ofAmici Curiae Don Howard Williams, Jr., And Owners' Counsel Of America
In Support Of Petitioners at 3, S. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298 (La.
2017) (No. 17-163), 2017 WL 4251906 [hereinafter Brief Amici Curiae Don Howard
Williams].
m State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 825--27 (Alaska 1976).
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need more than "a patchwork oflower court rules" 176 and protections implemented
by states. Citizens are entitled to just compensation and to being made whole. 177

A. Jarreau Rlustrates the Needfor Takings Compensation to Include Business Losses
The Louisiana Supreme Court failed to compensate Jarreau for his business losses. 178 Just compensation requires more than that-it requires Jarreau "be made
whole" again. 179 The fair market value compensation for Jarreau's land failed to fix
the serious disruptions caused by the taking of his property. 180 The Louisiana
Supreme Court's inadequate compensation adversely impacted Jarreau on many
levels: (1) it failed to award Jarreau the value of his dirt; 181 (2) it disrupted the
fulfillment of his business contracts;182 and (3) it imperiled his business's longevity
and location. 183
First, the award failed to provide him with adequate compensation for the value
ofhis dirt. 184 As Justice Hughes noted in his dissent, the Louisiana Supreme Court
"afftrn1[ed] an award of$11,869 despite evidence in the record that the dirt taken
from the land had a value in excess of $100,000."185 Jarreau built his business
around the value of the dirt on his land, the value of which increases when it is
excavated and prepared for a customer. 186 The trial court recognized the dirt's significant value, awarding Jarreau "$164,705.40 as compensation for the business losses."187
176

Brief Amici Curiae Don Howard Williams, supra note 174, at 3.
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 254--55 (1934); BriefAmici Curiae Don Howard
Williams, supra note 174, at 18.
178
S. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298, 313 (La. 2017).
179
Olson, 292 U.S. at 254--55.
180
Brief Amici Curiae NFIB, supra note 52, at 19. The fair market value ''formulation
overlooks the indisputable market value of commodities rooted in the land itself. ... Indeed,
none of the appraisals for the fair market value of the condemned land approximated the
independent market value of the underlying dirt." /d.
181
!d. at 20 ("[U]nder Louisiana's hardline rule, the farmer would be denied compensation
for 'lost profits' if the land were condemned at harvest-just as Mr. Jarreau has been denied
compensation for his carefully cultivated commercial-grade dirt.").
182
!d. at 11 ("[T]he South Lafourche Levee District took the land and destroyed an established property right (i.e., a contract) with concrete economic value.'').
183
BriefAmici Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation, supra note 49, at 13 ("Indeed, when real
property supporting an established business is condemned, the owner is forced either to relocate or lose his or her investment.'').
184
Brief Amici Curiae NFIB, supra note 52, at 20.
185
S. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298, 315 (La. 2017) (Hughes, J.,
dissenting).
186
Brief Amici Curiae NFIB, supra note 52, at 20 ("[T]he government should provide
independent compensation for the loss of transferable business assets created or cultivated
through investment of capital and sweat equity.'').
187
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 151, at *7.
177
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Given that the Levee District initially offered $1,326.69 for Jarreau's land-less than
one percent ofthe trial court's compensation for the land--property owners need more
robust just compensation protections against government overreach and abuse. 188
The trial court's actions help illustrate the high value ofthe excavated dirt compared to the value of the land itself. 189 The trial court essentially determined that the
dirt Jarreau excavated from the appropriated tract, ''without permission, after the
District had appropriated it," was worth more than the whole appropriated tract of
land because Jarreau had to pay more in damages to the Levee District for the excavated dirt than the fair market value of the appropriated tract of land. 190
The market value test for property is an inadequate measure of compensation
in order to fully compensate property owners who suffer business losses. 191 According to Richard Epstein, the problem with market value-''the price a willing seller
would receive from a willing buyer"-is that it "still contains a systematic bias that
underestimates the use value, which is typically in excess of its exchange value." 192
In a scenario where the market value is lower than the current use value, ''the present
owner will not sell at market price because selling will deprive him of the surplus
he obtains from present use, perhaps because the property is customized to his own
needs or provides him with speciallocational advantages." 193 Essentially, takings
can force transactions that would not occur at the fair market price because the property's use value could be higher for the owner.
Second, the taking disrupted Jarreau's fulfillment ofcontracts with customers. 194
Without any advance notice, the government abruptly prevented him from utilizing
his property to farm dirt for a contract requiring 23,000 cubic yards of dirt. 195 To
stop that process midstream on the government's whim and time frame should be
188

Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 302.

189

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 151, at *4, *7.
Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 298 ("[t]he decision below allows [the Levee District] to pay
Jarreau less than $12,000----even though the Levee District itself argued in the same proceeding that Jarreau had caused it more than $16,000 in damages by removing some of that
same dirt from the property after it was acquired."); Brief Amici Curiae NFffi, supra note
190

52, at 16 ("[11he lower court awarded Petitioners only $11,869.00 for the land, but awarded
$16,956.00 to the District 'for the dirt that Mr. Jarreau excavated after the tract had been
appropriated."').
191
Brief Amici Curiae NFIB, supra note 52, at 19 (The fair market value ''formulation
overlooks the indisputable market value of commodities rooted in the land itself.... Indeed,
none of the appraisals for the fair market value of the condemned land approximated the independent market value of the underlying dirt.'').
192
EPS1EIN, supra note 60, at 182--83.
193
Id. at 183.
194
Brief Amici Curiae NFIB, supra note 52, at 11.
19
~ See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 151, at *6; Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 302
(showing how the taking occurred abruptly and without advanced notice. The letter "demanded
that they 'immediately cease and desist performing any and all activities upon the property
as appropriated"').

2019]

TIME FOR A CHANGE IN EMINENT DOMAIN

1301

accounted for through the compensation calculation. 196 Additionally, the taking
would not only halt ongoing contracts, but also prevent new business development;
potential clients would be forced to go to a different excavator, and current relationships with clients would discontinue. 197 The government's taking of Jarreau's land
had the same effect as Hammer-where the government forced Kito to relocate his
bar, disrupted the operation ofthe business, and contributed to a loss ofprofits. 198
Finally, Jarreau cannot simply relocate to a comparable location because he lives
at his business. 199 He has literally built his life around his business.200 Although it is
potentially conceivable to relocate, fair market value does not tend to include relocation costs.201 It would be a significant burden for Jarreau to relocate, especially
given his ties to the land as his place of business and his home. 202
Even ifJarreau does not relocate immediately as a result ofthe taking, the government's action will require him to relocate earlier than he might have planned. With the
exception of the tract of land taken by the Levee District, Jarreau "dug up pretty
much the whole property.'>203 He had projected that he could stay on the property much
longer, but the government's taking may force him to have to transfer locations earlier
than anticipated. 204 Moreover, depending on the business, location is key. 20~ A bar
relocating, for instance, may not be able to easily keep all of its clientele-it has established a brand in that particular area.206 And for a dirt farmer like Jarreau, the quality of
196

State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 827 (Alaska 1976).
Luberv. Milwaukee Cty, 177N.W. 2d 380,384 (Wis. 1970). "[l]he [fair] market value
standard ... generally excludes recompense for incidental losses--losses typified by damage
to or destruction ofgood will, expenses incurred in moving to a new location and profits lost
because of business interruption or inability to relocate." I d. The practice continues despite
the fair market value standard ''reflect[ing] dubious wisdom and logic ...." Id.
198
Hammer, 550 P.2d at 823.
199
Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 302 ("Jarreau's home is situated on the front portion ofthe tract ...
and he operates Bayou Construction & Trucking Co.... over the remainder of the tract.").
197

200
201

202

See id.
See Luber v.Milwaukee Cty., 177 N.W. 2d 271, 384 (Wis. 1970).
Brief Amici Curiae Don Howard Williams, supra note 174, at 15 ("Compensation is

not 'just' when it allows the condemnor to artificially compensate only for the land, and not
for the fact that a business which is integral to that land and cannot be easily relocated is wiped
out by the taking.'').
203
Sherman, supra note 37.
204
Id. ("I dug up pretty much the whole property. I started in the front. I would have
started in the back.").
205
BriefAmici Curiae NFIB, supra note 52, at 8 ("The business might entirely lose its 'trade
routes' if forced to relocate to another City, where it must start fresh."). See also Lynda J.
Oswald, Goodwill and Going-Concern Value: Emerging Factors in the Just Compensation
Equation, 32 B.C. L. REv. 283, 353 (1991) ("The Hammer court thus held that a temporary
loss of profits during relocation resulting from the taking of property on which a business
was conducted was a 'damaging' of property for which the Alaska constitution mandates
compensation.").
206
See, e.g., BriefAmici Curiae NFIB, supra note 52, at9--1 0 ("[O]ur hypo1hetical family-run
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the dirt could play a significant role in satisfYing existing and future customers.207 In
both circumstances, the businesses will suffer from the disruptions caused by the
relocations.208 Many customers will find new businesses to serve their needs in the
time it takes for a business to relocate. 209
Since the government forces the property owners into an involuntary transaction, the government should bear the burden it causes to others. 210 Surely, it is the
government's job to protect the people, and it should not be permitted to harm
citizens unless it provides compensation to make those citizens whole again.211 As
Hammer reminds us, all other parties in society can be held responsible for lost
profits in other legal settings, such as tort actions and breach of contract actions, yet
the government receives a free pass when it forces citizens into an involuntary
transaction. 212 Furthermore, people can insure against other unexpected occurrences
in the their life, such as devastating weather. Insurance should not be necessary for
property owners as ''the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment [acts as] a form of
insurance," compensating for the losses caused to an individual. 213

restaurant might provide evidence that with condemnation its only available option for
relocation was to a neighboring community," where ''the company's base ofregular customers
has been displaced.'').
207
See id. at 7-8 (''Condemnation may also inflict long-term injuries, as small businesses
may fm.d it difficult (sometimes impossible) to locate a comparable site that will satisfY their
business needs with an affordable price-point.'').
208
See id. at 7 ("Small businesses are especially vulnerable because eminent domain may
cause temporary disruptions.'').
209
See id. at 7-8.
210
See Baileyv. United States, 78 Fed CL 239,260 (Fed. Cl. 2007) (explaining how eminent
domain is an involuntary transaction: "[O]nce the involuntary 'transaction' accomplished by the
eminent domain process is completed ... that interest is no longer the property owner's to sell.'').
211
See LOCKE, supra note 58, at 62; see also United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16
(1970).
212
State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 824 (Alaska 1976). See also Tara Kinman, Striking
a Balance in the Valuation ofTemporary Takings: Examining the Award ofLost Profits in
Primetime Hospitality, Inc. v. City ofAlbuquerque, 40 N.M. L. REv. 33 7, 346 (20 10) (providing
another example where lost profits are recoverable: "[M]odern conversion law has recognized that lost profits are recoverable as a consequential damage in all but one jurisdiction.'').
213
Eric K.ades,Avoiding Takings "Accidents": A Tort Perspective on Takings Law, 28 U.
Rica L. REv.1235, 1240--47 (1994) (highlighting, in one part, the theory of''no compensation"
as a replacement for just compensation. Under no compensation, property owners purchase their
own insurance, rather than relying on the insurance provided by just compensation). The ''no
compensation" theory argues that the Takings Clause essentially provides free insurance,
creating economic inefficiencies as property owners enter into economically inefficient ventures. Normally, under private insurance, they would avoid these ventures because they
would have to pay a premium to receive coverage, making it an inefficient option compared
to other, less-risky ventures not requiring insurance. However, the assumption built into the
argument is that the government will actually adequately compensate the party involved,
similar to a private insurer. Id.
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B. Rebutting Three Theories Against Awarding Compensation for Consequential
Damages, Such as Lost Profits
Hammer highlights three theories for not awarding compensation for lost profits: (1) ''that damage to personal property need not be compensated for"; (2) "that
the state has taken the land only, and not the business"; and (3) ''that the damages
are too speculative to be awarded."214 These theories are not only problematic at the
state level, but also the national level and the way we interpret the Constitution's
Takings Clause.m
1. Damage to Personal Property
In Hammer, the Alaska court awarded compensation for damage to personal
property because the Alaska Constitution had more stringent protections for just
compensation than the U.S. Constitution, which "does not expressly require compensation for damage to property."216 However, the distinction in the language is
without major difference: the U.S. Constitution states "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation," while Article 1, Section 18 of the
Alaska Constitution, states ''Private Property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation."217 It seems the only major difference in the language
is Alaska includes protections for "damages," while the U.S. Constitution does not
explicitly mention damages to personal property.218
The Supreme Court, however, has recognized that a proper understanding ofthe
Takings Clause andjust compensation would extend to consequential damages, such
as "future loss of profits, the expense of moving removable fixture and personal
property from the premises, the loss of good-will which inheres in the location of
the land, or other like consequential losses." 219 In the 1945 case of United States v.
General Motors Corporation, 220 the Court explained that "ifthe owner is to be made
whole for the loss consequent on the sovereign's seizure of his property," business
losses and other consequential losses "should properly be considered."221 Then, the
Court declined to extend protections to these losses.222 The Court openly provided
less than what just compensation, properly interpreted, would require. 223
214

Hammer, 550 P.2d at 823. See also Michael Debow, Unjust Compensation: The
Continuing Need for Reform, 46 S.C. L. REv. 579, 586 (1995); Oswald, supra note 205, at
351-54.
215
See Hammer, 550 P.2d at 824.
216 Id.
217
U.S. CONST. amend. V.; ALASKA CONST. art. I,§ 18.
21s Id.
219
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945).
220
323 u.s. 373 (1945).
221
Id. at 379.
222
Id. at 379---80.
223
See Kinman, supra note 212, at 346 ("[T]he Court noted that consequential damages
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The Court in General Motors Corporation highlighted three reasons for extending protections to businesses losses and other consequential damages. 224 The first
reason was that anyone selling their property would consider those factors in their
valuation.:w Surely, the Court admitted, "all these elements would be considered by
an owner in determining whether, and at what price, to sel1."226
Second, the Court acknowledged that "ifthe owner is to be made whole for the loss
consequent on the sovereign's seizure of his property, these elements should properly be considered.'>227 In other words, to make someone whole from injury, just compensation would require consideration of these factors to reach a determination of
proper compensation.228 Anything less fails to make the property owner whole again.229
Finally, the Court's definition of property would require protections under the
Takings Clause as the definition extends beyond the land itself. 230 The Court defined
property as ''the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing,
as the right to possess, use and dispose of it.'>23 1 Under that definition, property extends
beyond the land itself, also including the use of the land and how to "dispose of it." 232
Therefore, property under the Takings Clause necessarily includes property beyond
the land itself, including the right to use the property and the built up "good-will
which inheres in the location of the land" from operating a business on the land.233
The Court's definition of property, therefore, affords property owners more protection under the Takings Clause than the Court actually extends.234
The Court, through these three reasons, essentially admitted it improperly interpreted the Takings Clause.235 The arbitraty determination holds the government to
a different standard than the rest ofsociety.236 Despite the Court's blunt honesty, it
maintained the rule in place, disregarding any possible obligation to compensate
business losses and other consequential losses. 237 The Court should shift its current
could be considered in calculating market value, as they would likely be used in determining the
price an owner would accept for the property; however, they were not awardable as individual damages in condemnation cases.").
224
General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 377-79.
225
Id. at 379.
226
227
22

'
229

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.

230

Id. at 377-78.
231
Id. at 378.
232
!d. This understanding ofthe property also corresponds with Madison's understanding
as laid out in his essay, Property. Madison, supra note 65.
233

General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 379.

234

Id. at 379--SO.
See id. at 377-79.

235
236

See State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 824 (Alaska 1976) (finding lost profits calculable
and awardable in other legal contexts).
237
General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 379--SO.
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interpretation to meet the broader definition of property acknowledged by the Court
itself and actually protected by the Alaska Supreme Court.
2. The State Has Taken the Land Only, and Not the Business
In Hammer, Alaska had greater protections in place for just compensation than in
Mitchell. However, the Alaska court still criticized Mitchell Court's understanding
of the Takings Clause that ''the state takes only the land," thus compensation does not
flow to property owners for business losses.238 Specifically, in Mitchell ''the destruction" ofthe business ''was an unintended incident ofthe taking ofthe land. "239 The view
"look[s] at the benefit to the condemnor as a measure of compensation," not the
"loss of the owner."240 The eminent domain proceeding, as interpreted by Mitchell,
"fails to provide a realistic measure of what has been taken."241
The harms caused by excluding business losses from just compensation could
be significant. For example, farmers make huge investments into their land as they
"expend thousands of dollars in preparing land, planting, fertilizing, managing pests
and irrigating a crop."242 From there, the "farmer reasonably expects to make at least
a modest return on investment--consistent with prevailing markets. "243 But when
the government intervenes, the farmers may no longer be able to fulfill ''production
contracts to sell their products to suppliers long before harvest."244 As a result, the
farmers could face serious costs as they ''may be forced either to pay money back
to the purchaser or to buy commodities from another party in order to avoid a breach
when their lands are condemned."245 Under the Mitchell standard, where the government is heavily favored at the expense of the property owner, the farmer suffers
significant losses without compensation because the government's taking will not
be compensated beyond the value of the land.246
Like farmers who have their land "condemned at harvest" Jarreau was "denied
compensation for his carefully cultivated commercial-grade dirt," while disrupting his
contracts to customers.247 As the amici parties explain, "[i]n condemning Mr. Jarreau's
property, the [government] took the land and destroyed an established property right
(i.e., a contract) with concrete economic value.'>248 "[A] realistic measure ofwhat has
been taken" would include business losses, such as the broken contract. 249
238
239
240
241

242
243
244

245
246

247
248

249

Hammer, 550 P.2d at 823.
Id. at 824 (quoting Mitchell v. U.S., 267 U.S. 341, 345 (1925)).
Id.
Id.
Brief Amici Curiae NFIB, supra note 52, at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 345 (1925).
Brief Amici Curiae NFIB, supra note 52, at 20.
Jd. at 11.
State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 824 (Alaska 1976).
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Since the federal interpretation of the Takings Clause is weak in its protections,
property owners, like Jarreau, must rely on state protections.2so But in some cases,
the protections are not as robust as Alaska's, leaving property owners in a worse
position than before the taking.~ 1 But asHammerpoints out, the federal government
standard "simply ignor[es], for the pwposes of compensation, the destruction of''
businesses.~2 The government fails to effectively protect the people, or even worse,
directly harms the people, by "blind[ing] itself to the realities of condemnation!'~3
The farmer example further illustrates how takings can result in a diminution of
value in the remaining land, which also diminishes the ability to generate profits.~• For
farmers or even ranchers, "a taking that severs an existing farm or ranch may greatly
diminish the potential to generate future revenue on the remaining parcel because
a smaller plat ofland has less production capacity."m Similarly, Jarreau's remaining
land will suffer a diminution in value due to a decrease in productive capacity.~6
3. Damages Are Too Speculative
Despite claims that damages are too speculative, they are not seen as too speculative in other legal settings.m As Hammer illustrated: "Loss ofprofits damages have
been awarded in a variety of civil contexts, including tort actions (both personal and
business), breach of contract actions, antitrust suits, and suits for infringement of a
patent or trademark. "~ 8 Moreover, there is a check on abusing compensation for lost
profits259-the burden ofproofis on the party claiming the losses: "Since such loss
of profits is an item of special damages, the condemnee has the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence the amount of profits lost as a direct result ofthe
state's taking; such proof must meet the requirement of reasonable certainty as indicated." 260 Essentially, the argument that loss of profits damages are too speculative
is quite an overstatement.
250

See Brief Amici Curiae Don Howard Williams, supra note 174, at 3.
CompareS. Lafourche Levee Dist v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298, 311 (La 2017) (compensating takings in Louisiana does ''not include los[t] profits''), with Hammer, 550 P.2d at
825-27 (compensating takings in Alaska includes lost profits).
252
Hammer, 550 P.2d at 824.
253 Id.
254
Brief Amici Curiae NFIB, supra note 52, at 21 n.21.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257
Hammer, 550 P.2d at 824.
258 Id.
259
I d. at 824-25 ("In any case seeking loss of profits, such damages must be 'reasonably
certain': the trier offact must be able to determine the amount oflost profits :from evidence on
251

the record and reasonable interferences therefrom, not :from mere speculation and wishful
thinking.").
260
I d. at 827.
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C. New Standard for Just Compensation: (1) Expand Kimball Laundry to
Permanent Takings and (2) Adopt Louisiana's Previous Standard
1. Reasoning of Kimball Laundry Should Apply to Both Temporary and
Permanent Takings
In the Respondent's Brief in opposition to Jarreau's writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court, the Levee District argued that Kimball Laundry grants compensation
for going-<:oncern value ''when the government takes temporary use of a business for
itself, •• which is not ''the case in any permanent taking of fee business property. "261
While the Respondent correctly interpreted Kimball Laundry, the Court should
reconsider its arbitrary distinction between temporary and permanent takings. 262
Justice Douglas, in his Kimball Laundry dissent, disagreed with the majority's
distinction between permanent and temporary takings: "[w]hy the latter is compensable when the former is not is a mystery."263 Justice Douglas found permanent
takings to be more harmful to property owners than temporary takings, explaining
"[t]here would be a complete destruction ofthe trade-routes if the taking ofthe plant
were permanent and a depreciation of them (I assume) where it is temporary."254
Justice Douglas questioned the Court's distinction because he opposed compensating consequential damages in any taking-temporary or permanent-but his
point inadvertently helps illustrate why both temporary takings and permanent
takings should receive compensation.265 Specifically, if permanent takings are potentially more burdensome on a business, they should receive similar, not less,
compensation for business losses under the Fifth Amendment.266
The Court in Kimball Laundry downplayed the impact a permanent taking could
have on a business. 267 Consider, for example, a similar situation to Kimball Laundry,
where all else is the same, except the government permanently takes the laundromat.
261

Brief in Opposition at 20, 22, S. Lafourche Levee District v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298
(La. 2017) (No. 17-163), 2017 WL 4251905.
262
See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much is Just?, 42 CAm.
U. L. REv. 721, 746 (1993) ("While there are factual differences between the paired cases
(temporary rather than permanent taking, private party rather than government as the source
of the expectation, leasehold rather than fee interest), it is not clear that these factual differences justify the differing outcomes.").
263
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 23 (1949) (Douglas, J ., dissenting).
264 Id.
26~ Id.
266

See Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age ofRedevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67
YALEL.J. 61, 83-84 (1957) (''But here again, the condemnee in a temporary taking seems
no more deserving of special consideration than a condemnee whose fee is taken and whose
entire good will is destroyed.'').
261
Kimball Laundry, 33 8 U.S. at 11 ("[O]nly the physical property has been condemned,
leaving the owner free to move his business to a new location.'').
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This action could be incredibly disruptive and have a devastating impact on a
business's intangible value, such as goodwill. 268 For instance, in a large city, the
laundromat's success is based on how well it serves its nearby customers, building
up trust, while offering convenient service. 269 Taking the property and requiring the
business to transfer to a new location hurts the intangible value of the business-customers will not follow despite the good service because the convenience of a
closer laundromat will likely prevai1.270 The business would need to start from
scratch and compete against others for clients.271 In Kimball Laundry, the business
had operated for at least "eighteen years preceding the taking." 272 Moving the business to a new location, away from its customer base, could have a devastating impact
on the business's profits, built upon the goodwill of its customers.273
In circumstances where a business operation is not easily transferable to a new,
comparable location, compensation should be granted for consequential intangible
losses, such as the loss of an established customer base. 274
2. Adopt Louisiana's Pre-2006 "Full Extent of the Loss" Standard for Just
Compensation275
In 1974, Louisiana enacted a Constitutional requirement for compensation "to
the full extent of [the] loss," adjusting the previous 1921language of''just and adequate
compensation. 'm6 The "full extent of [the] loss" standard "broadened the measure
ofdamages," requiring that the impacted property owner "be placed in an equivalent
financial position to that which he enjoyed before the taking."277 These included
261

See Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age a/Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, supra
note 266, at 74--75.
269
See id. ("[Goodwill] inheres in the business aside from the physical property and grows
from the personality and ability of the proprietor, the reputation ofthe business and the customers' habit of dealing with a firm due to its tradition and familiarity.").
270
See id. at 75 ("[For] good will, often completely destroyed or greatly damaged when
the owner must move from the neighborhood to some other locale, American courts rarely
admit giving compensation.'').
271
See id.
272
Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 8.
273
See Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age ofRedevelopment: Incidental Losses, supra
note 266, at 75 ("[D]ismissing [goodwill] loss, as one court has, by stating that 'a good plumber
should be able to continue his business in almost any location and do as well as he formerly
did in a neighborhood where in many homes there was a lack of adequate plumbing facilities,' expresses business naivete.'').
274
See id. at 74--75.
m S. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298, 306 (La 2017).
276
I d. See Megan S. Peterson, Condemnation Blight: The Needfor Adoption in Louisiana,
57 LOY. L. REv. 299,307 (2011); see also Howard, supra note 160, at 821.
277
Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 306.
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"inconvenience and loss of profits from the takings of business premises so that
landowners were compensated for their loss, not merely the loss of their land. "278
The "full extent ofthe loss" standard is similar to the protections provided in Kimball
Laundry, except it extends to both permanent and temporary takings.279 Most importantly, the standard accurately reflects what has been taken, while the current
federal Mitchell standard, "fails to provide a realistic measure of [this]. "280

D. Practical Benefits: Compensation for Lost Profits Would Force the
Government to Change Its Approach to Eminent Domain in Two Crucial Ways
Two big practical benefits will flow from a requirement that compensation extends to lost profits. First, the government will be more cautious in choosing to use
its eminent domain power since it could result in higher costs. 281 This could help prevent abuses as in Kelo, where the government claimed the land for a supposedly better
purpose, yet ultimately harmed the community.282 By providing broader compensation for takings, such as consequential damages and incidental losses, the government
would more carefully use its eminent domain power, and only when absolutely necessary.283 In addition to using the power more sparingly, it also could lead to better
choices for use of the takings power. Essentially, the government will try to select
a condemnee who will be least impacted by the taking to avoid high compensation
costs.284 For example, in the case of Jarreau, ifjust compensation included lost profits,
the government might have pursued a different source of dirt ifa lower cost option was
available. While the source might not be as conveniently located as Jmreau's dirt, the
government could have a cost incentive to acquire the dirt elsewhere, perhaps from a
dirt plot not currently in use for a business. These prudent selections of takings would
benefit the person operating the business, but also the customers who interact with the
business, lessening disruptions to business transactions and the broader economy.28~
mId.
279
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S.1, 13 (1949) (quoting Boston Chamber
of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910)).
280
State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 823 (Alaska 1976).
281
Statev. AlaskaLaserWashlnc., 382P.3d 1143, 1153 (Alaska2016)(Fabe,J., dissenting
in part) ("[B] ecause the State could control the amount ofdamages by, for example, 'giving precise and early notice,' a business owner could claim lost profits as additional compensation.'').
282
McGeehan, supra note 17.
283
Brief Amici Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation, supra note 49, at 15 ("[B]y preventing
the government from transferring the business costs associated with condemnation to individual
owners---which is precisely what occurs when such losses are excluded from compensation--the
govermnent is forced to consider the full and actual costs and benefits of eminent domain.'').
284
!d. ("As a result, the government will make more economically efficient condemnation
decisions.'').
m I d. at 16 ("Ifthis prevents some public projects from going forward, it is only because
the projects did not make overall economic sense in the first place.'').
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The second major benefit is that the government would have an incentive to
offer the business reasonable advance notice, providing more time to adjust to the
disruption.286 Rather than the challenges of adjusting to the random actions of the
state, a reasonable time frame to respond to the taking would alleviate some of the
costs to businesses.287 When the government taxes citizens, it does not randomly
choose days and capriciously spring costs on them, upending their lives. 288 If it did,
people would revolt. The current, scheduled taxation system allows citizens to plan
their budget, spending, and life according to the predictable yearly occurrence of
Tax Day. Some targets of eminent domain are not as fortunate to have advance
notice, causing serious disruptions in their lives.289 Abuse of the tax power would
likely stir political changes because taxes apply to every member of society.290
Because eminent domain only impacts a small minority of the population, there is
likely less political willpower behind reforms.291
For Jarreau, advance notice could have been far less disruptiv~ 92 and could have
allowed him to complete his contractual obligations, keep his customers, and search
for a new location for his business. 293
CONCLUSION

The Takings Clause does not require "some form of compensation," but ''just
compensation" for a government taking. A proper understanding ofjust compensation cannot ignore real consequential harms that result from a taking. The Supreme
Court in General Motors Corporation admitted as much: "[I]f the owner is to be
made whole for the loss consequent on the sovereign's seizure of his property, these
elements should properly be considered. "294 By inconsistently providing consequential compensation for temporary takings and not permanent takings, the Supreme
286

State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 827 (Alaska 1976).

Id.
288
See, e.g., IRS, Tax Filing Season Begins Jan. 29, Tax Returns Due Apri/17; Help
Available for Taxpayers (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/2018-tax-filing-sea
287

son-begins-jan-29-tax-returns-due-April-17-help-available-for-taxpayers [https ://perma cc
IW2D5-SJGK].
289
See id.
290
See George J. Stigler, The Theory ofEconomic Regulation, 2 BEIL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI., 12 (1971) (''The system is calculated to implement all strongly felt preferences of majorities and many strongly felt preferences ofminorities but to disregard the lesser preferences
of majorities and minorities.").
291
See id.
292
S. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298, 302 (La. 2017) (showing how the
taking occurred abruptly and without advanced notice). The letter "demanded that they 'immediately cease and desist performing any and all activities upon the property as appropriated.'"
293
Brief Amici Curiae NFIB, supra note 52, at 7.
294
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945).
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Court has a foot in two irreconcilable camps.295 The Court should reconsider its stance
on permanent takings in order to create a consistent standard that adequately protects
its citizens, similar to the previous "full extent of the loss" standard in Louisiana.296
Society and the Court should not become comfortable with interpretations ofthe law
that bypass foundational legal protections at the expense of a small minority in the
name of convenience, cost saving, or the public good.297

295
296
297

Id. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 14, 15 (1949).
See Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 306.
See Armstrongv. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960) (''The Fifth Amendment's guar-

antee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was
designed to bar government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."); State v. Hammer, 550
P.2d 820, 827 (Alaska 1976) ("Placing such a burden on the property owner is no more ...
just than assessing a levy against him but no others.''); Peterson, supra note 276, at 304 ("[T]he
public is better equipped than the individual landowner to bear the burden ofpublic improvements."). See also Madison, supra note 65 (explaining how an unjust government takes
property "by arbitrary seizures of one class of citizens for the service of the rest").

